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Abstract: This paper aims to bring to the public one of the most important moments in the history of modern 
times of Albania. After the Albanian independence on 28 November 1912 and international recognition of 
Albanian state on 29 July 1913, in 1919-1920, many national and international events unraveled which initially 
posed a real danger for Albania to become an independent state. The Paris Peace Conference, organized after the 
First World War by the Great Powers which win the war, and in which 27 winning states took part, became the 
real world center of that time. The Albanian point of view was headed directly at this Conference, with the hope to 
gain its independence and to win the right of self determination for its people. The main issues of the Conference 
were: border correction, especially in the southern part of Albania, relations between the Balkan states regarding 
Albania, the position of Italy, Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and the position of Greece over Albania, 
and the real threat of secret pact during the First World War and the new role of American President, Woodrow 
Wilson. This paper also aims to bring the attitude of the Albanian delegation at the Paris Peace Conference and 
the position of Italy, France, Great Britain and Greece. 
 
Keywords: Albania; France; Italy; Greece; United States; Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Great Britain; 
Paris Conference; Delegation 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
After Durrës Congress, at the beginning of 1919, the attention of Albanian people was 
focused on Paris. The Peace Conference started the works here officially on 18 January, 
organized by the five war winning Big Powers, Great Britain, France, Italy, USA and Japan. As 
usually, in such cases, the winners would dictate peace conditions to the defeated. In the First 
World War, Albania did not take side, neither with the winners, nor with the defeated. 
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However, it was invaded by several military forces of some winning powers which 
aimed at violating its territorial integrity, and there was a risk of nullifying the independence 
achieved in 1913. Meanwhile, Albanian representatives who went to Paris required from the 
Conference to review the past injustices, hoping that the self-determination principle would 
be respected. These hopes were grounded in particular on the participation of American 
representatives headed by President Woodrow Wilson in the conference. The USA was not a 
signatory to any secret treaties and they pronounced openly that peace would be established 
not on the basis of such treaties, but by respecting fair principles. In addition, USA formulated 
then its own attitude for the postwar regulation by stressing that “they would keep the 
position of arbitrator and they would act according to American justice tradition and 
magnanimity” (Frus 1919, 47). 
 
THE POSITION OF GREECE 
 
The Peace Conference did not take into consideration the Albanian delegation 
demands. Since the beginning, it started to review the claims of Greek government submitted 
in writing and orally by E. Venizelos. The government of Athens required the annexation of 
Korçë and Gjirokastër (Clogg 2004, 43). The Greek Prime Minister appeared before the 
Conference with the invented and no old-fashioned thesis according to which the Christian 
(Orthodox) Albanians that comprised half of the inhabitants of these regions felt themselves 
as Greeks. E. Venizelos referred also to London Treaty of April 1915, which charged Italy not 
to oppose the annexation of southern Albania by Greece if this should be required by other 
Treaty signatories, Great Britain and France (the fourth signatory, the tsarist government of 
Russia, toppled over by October revolution did not take part in the Conference) and if Italy 
would take for itself what this Treaty provided for. For this reason, the Greek government 
representative did not pronounce against the claims of Italy for Albania, but for the division 
of Albania with the neighbor across the Adriatic.  
 
THE POSITION OF SERBIA 
 
Another attitude was held by representatives of Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes or Yugoslavia (It was renamed as Yugoslavia in 1929 after the 9 January dictatorship, 
at the point of the Paris Peace Conference it was still the Kingdom of SCS), which did not 
express any territorial demands toward Albania directly. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes delegation pronounced for the independence of Albania in the borders of 1913. This 
diplomatic attitude was determined by the strong Italian-Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes rivalry in the Adriatic and in Albania. The Belgrade government was willing to have 
in its south-western borders a small Albanian independent State rather than an aggressive 
neighbor as Italy on Albanian land, which would urge the destabilization and dissolution of 
the multinational Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes state.  
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On the other hand, Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes government was thinking 
to place Albania under its political influence through E. Toptani, by supporting his ambitions 
to come to the head of Albanian government and state (Fischer 2204, 34). 
Meanwhile, Belgrade diplomacy connected its attitude towards Albania with that of 
the two other neighboring states. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes Memorandum 
submitted to the Conference in February 1919 stated that if the right of invasion to 
protectorate in some parts or the entire Albania of 1913 would be recognized for some other 
country, then, for „protection of its vital interests‟, Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 
reserves the right to require the part that „belonged to it‟. This double attitude of Belgrade 
would continue throughout the Peace Conference and it aimed at achieving two goals: a) to 
separate the conflict between Rome and Belgrade for land division between the former 
Austro-Hungarian Empire, for which both parties had claims, from that of the division of 
Albania, as foreseen in its Treaty of April 1915; b) to place Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes in the same footing with Greece and especially with Italy for Albanian State division 
and not allow them to exclude it from this division as Italian diplomacy was trying to do so. 
So the previous Austrian-Italian rivalry for Albania was replaced by the Italian-Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes antagonism (Fischer 2004, 45).  
 
THE POSITION OF ITALY 
 
On its part, the Italian government aimed at ensuring first of all the possession of 
Vlora, as an important geostrategic point in the Southern Adriatic and putting over the Italian 
protectorate the “Albanian autonomous state”, that was foreseen to be established on the 
“Muslim” Middle Albania (Montanelli 2005, 12). Also Rome demanded that this protectorate 
or control should be extended possibly to the borders of Albanian of 1913. Italian delegation 
neither did nor presents these claims immediately to the Conference, as the Greek delegation 
did. Italy did not make this immediately because it was listed among the winning Big Powers 
that has organized the Conference and gave themselves some special rights compared to 
other smaller winning countries. In addition to this, there were contradictions for the future of 
Albania not only among the three rival neighboring countries but also among the three main 
powers of the Conference.  
 
THE USA POSITION  
 
The USA, Great Britain and France did not have the same attitude for the political and 
territorial future of Albanian state. Discussion at the Conference demonstrated that they had 
agreements and contradictions as well. Initially, because of not having a good knowledge 
about the Balkan issues, Washington accepted the view of London and Paris, according to 
which the independence of Albania and territorial integrity of the Albanian state would be 
sacrificed for the interests of neighboring countries, winners of World War I, though Albania 
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had been neutral to the war and normally did not have to pay for it. In order to justify this 
attitude, representatives of the European big powers evaluated the international recognition 
of Albania in 1913 as an independent and sovereign state as a premature action (FRUS 1942, 
59). The intentional, large and deafening propaganda that considered the economic-social 
life of Albanian people primitive, especially the one that came from neighboring countries 
had undoubtedly influenced the representatives of European politics. 
Consequently, it was decided that Albania should be included in the system of 
mandates, established at the end of the world war for the countries and peoples that had not 
yet won their independence and would need to be under the tutelage of a „civilized power‟ 
to lead them towards independence. In this way, Albanians were unjustly included in the 
group of people that would detach from the dissolved multinational states, as Ottoman 
Empire and Austro-Hungary, peoples that were colonized by defeated Germany. 
The three big powers to the Conference also came to a common opinion that this 
power should be Italy, which had required since the war the protectorate form. It would 
demand the control over Albania in the form of mandate over Albania even during the Peace 
Conference. Representatives of the three powers manifested for the first time their readiness 
to place the post-war Albanian state under the mandate of Italy in May 1919, in the 
framework of efforts to satisfy claims in Albania and in the Adriatic and they were repeated in 
September 1919, after the request for the mandate submitted officially at the end of August 
by the new Foreign Minister of Italy T. Tittoni (DDI 1952, 170). 
W. Wilson confirmed to his colleagues of Great Britain and France, Ll. George and G. 
Clemenceau on 6 May 1919 that “Albanians are terrified by and despite the idea of 
subjugation to Italy”, however he agreed with their views. Having left Paris at the end of June 
1919, though he recommended to R. Lasing, his Secretary of Foreign Affairs to take care 
about the „fate of Albania‟ and „her rights‟ he accepted in the middle of September 1919 the 
issue of mandate of Italy over this country, Albania. However, W. Wilson took care to set 
conditions to it so that “exploitation or colonization” of Albania could be avoided (FRUS 1942, 
345). The decision of American diplomacy to give the mandate to Italy was naturally dictated 
be the aim to iron out Italian-SCS contradiction on one side, but as it seems also by 
oscillations and indetermination of Albanian delegation in Paris.  
The three big powers submitted their approval to recognize Italy‟s mandate over 
Albania in the Memorandum of 9 December 1919 that they submitted also to the Italian 
delegation in the Conference. The Memo attached to this Memorandum states that the three 
powers do not lack the will to recognize the independence of Albanian state, but “this state 
that will need the administrative advice and assistance of any of the Three Big Powers. From 
its geographical position and from its economic capacity, Italy is the most appropriate State 
to carry out this duty” (Macmillan 2006, 149). 
The specific provisions of the mandate and Fundamental statute of Albanian state 
would be drafted by a commission composed of three members, one of which would be the 
representative of Rome government, one from the League of Nations and the third would be 
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the representative of Albanian state. The latter would be appointed not by Albania, by its 
institutions, but by the main winning powers. These provisions (of mandate and Statute) 
would be approved by the Council of the League of Nations that was founded at the end of 
World War I and which the mission of preventing armed conflicts among the states and to 
preserve peace in the world.  
The project that was drafted at the Peace Conference in 1919 for placing the post-war 
Albanian State under Italy‟s mandate violated the independence and sovereignty that it won 
some years ago. Besides, the Albanians were treated in a discriminatory way. They did not 
respect for it even the procedure that Covenant of the League of Nations provided for. 
Albanian people were not asked to give their opinion with regard to the state to which the 
mandate would be commissioned as provided for by Article 22 of the Covenant. These 
attitudes disregarded also the statements of Albanian delegation in the Conference which 
opposed the inclusion of Albanian in the group of countries over which the system of 
mandates would be applied. Representatives of the three powers of the Conference agreed 
not only upon Albania‟s independence violation but also on the other more important issue, 
violation of territorial integrity of the Albanian state in order to favor further neighboring 
countries by approving some of their claims. None if these powers objected the placing of 
Vlora region under the sovereignty of Italy and neither the transfer of Gjirokastër region 
within the political borders of Greece. Because of their geo-strategic position, Vlora and 
Gjirokastër became a prey, the first of Italy for its control over Otranto Channel and the 
second of Greece to dominate the Corfu Channel (Duka 2007, 70). 
Regarding the other annexationist claims of neighboring countries, the representatives 
of the three powers kept differentiated attitudes. The USA representatives took care not to 
fragment further the regions of Albanian state, whereas the representatives of Great Britain 
and more those of France, having deep contradictions with Italy, were inclined to narrow 
further the geographical space of Albanian State, on which the Italian mandate would be 
extended. These contradictory attitudes were noted since the beginning of the Conference, 
when in February 1919 the four winning Big Powers (Great Britain, France, Italy, and the USA) 
created the committee to review Greek claims.  
The representatives of London and Paris expressed their opinion in the report that this 
committee submitted in March 1919 that the entire southern Albania should be transferred to 
Greece, whereas Americans came out with a proposal that only Gjirokastër region would be 
transferred to Greece from the mountain of Nemërçkë down to the seaside, whereas the 
Korça region should remain within the border of Albania. Worried by the fact that their claims 
were not yet reviewed, but also coveting Albania with no partners, Italians pronounced for 
preservation of borders of 1913 in the south. As a consequence of these contradictions, the 
issue of Albanian-Greek border remained open (Puto 2009, 45). The Conference work started 
with the review of the Peace Treaty with Germany (to be signed in Versailles, near Paris, on 
28 June 1919) (Macmillan 2006, 54). The three main powers were interested in this, Great 
Britain, France and USA. Claims of Italy over Albania started to be discussed in April 1919, 
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together with her demands for lands of former Austro-Hungarian Empire, which lay mainly 
along the Adriatic coast. The merge of these two issues was not random, it related to London 
Treaty of April 1915 (with Articles 4-7), according to which the Adriatic Sea from the north to 
its south was conceived from the military-maritime point of view as one whole, an Italian lake 
which should serve for Italy‟s strategic „defense‟. Consequently the eastern coast sea, from 
Vlora in the south up to Dalmatia and Trieste in the north, was demanded to be placed 
under Italian control, regardless of whether it was inhabited by Albanian and Slav people, 
that is, non-Italians.  
Faced before such claims that violated the ethnic principle, the USA representatives, 
free of London Treaty obligation, came against the annexationist claims of Rome government 
over those territories. However, they accepted in the meantime the concept of Italy‟s 
„security‟ in the Adriatic and based on this, they accepted the territorial extension of Italy to 
some strategic positions along the coast. So, in the memorandum of 14 April 1919 addressed 
to the Italian government, American President Wilson accepted the Italian possession of 
Polas in the north, an island in the central part (in Dalmatian coast) and possession of Vlora in 
the south of Adriatic, considering them sufficient for control of this sea by Italy (DDI 1954, 
456). The attention that American delegation and specifically the President W. Wilson paid to 
Albanian question by reviewing also the territorial demands of Albanian party, 
pronouncements of the delegation head in some cases to the benefit of Albanians, testify 
that USA, or the American diplomacy was the only among decision makers of the Peace 
Conference that was concerned in some way that the territories given to Albania in 1913 
remain (Macmillan 2006, 160). The USA attitude could be noticed in the Memorandum of 9 
December 1919 and openly in February-March of 1920, in the period after the Conference, 
when W. Wilson opposed strongly the English-French-Italian plan of 13-14 January of that 
year, which in essence implemented London Secret Treaty of 1915 that fragmented Albania 
badly and nullified its independence. The Memorandum of 9 December came as a need for 
the coordination of the attitude for questionable issues among representatives of USA, Great 
Britain and France.  
In this Memorandum they submitted the same opinions for the „Adriatic issue‟ 
Resolution, and their views regarding the claims of the three neighboring states in Albania, of 
Italy and the two Balkan states. The drafting of the 9 December document is actually 
considered more as a view of the American representatives. Pursuant to it, full sovereignty 
over Vlora and its entire region was recognized for Italy, Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes was allowed only the right of the commercial exit in the northern Albania by leaving 
thus unaffected the borders of 1913, whereas no common opinion was reached about 
Albanian-Greek border. However, according to the Memorandum of 9 December, Greece 
would invade Albanian lands of Gjirokastër region that lay in the west of Nermërçkë 
Mountains, including Tepelenë and Kurvelesh. The invasion of Gjirokastër region was only 
one step towards its annexation by Greece. The future of Korça remained again subject to 
negotiations among representatives of USA, France and Great Britain on one hand, which 
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possessed the right to speak on behalf of Albania, and representatives if Italy and Greece on 
the other hand (FRUS 1942, 345). Meanwhile, this Memorandum did not satisfy Rome, 
because of the Resolution given to Fiume issue, neither Athens for the reservation held 
towards the future of Korça. It infuriated more Belgrade that saw it excluded from division of 
Albania and in military difficult defensive positions related to Italy. According to the Kingdom 
of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes delegation, the powers were interested only in the „strategic 
security‟ in the Adriatic. In these conditions, Belgrade delegation, headed by N. Pasic, in the 
note sent to the Conference on 8 January 1920, defended again the attitude expressed in 
February 1919, according to which his government preferred the establishment in the borders 
of 1913. The note of N. Pasic stressed also that if the proposal would be rejected again, 
Belgrade would demand the annexation of northern Albania down river to Drin River, 
promising in this case to give a local administrative autonomy to Shkoder. The Kingdom of 
SCS delegation demanded now a „more favorable‟ border for Belgrade, from the economic 
and strategic point of view. In this case there was no mention of „correction of borders‟, as 
the Kingdom of SCS memorandum of 8 January stated, but annexation of all territories on 
the right side of Black Drin and Buna Rivers, and mountains of Kelmend and Krasniq.  
To satisfy further the neighbors of Albania, especially the Kingdom of Serbia, Croats 
and Slovenes, the Prime minister of Great Britain and France, D. Lloyd George and G. 
Clemenceau, in the absence of USA representatives, reached a compromise on 13 January 
1920 with the Italian counterpart, Nitti, according to which Albania would be divided among 
the three neighboring countries, almost in the same way as London Treaty of 1915 provided 
for. According to this compromise, Fiume would be transferred to Italy, whereas the Kingdom 
of Serbia, Croats and Slovenes would receive as compensation the northern Albania with the 
center in Shkoder, which would enjoy „the autonomy‟ like that of Rutene region in 
Czechoslovakia.  
Greece would annex Korça and Gjirokastër, whereas Italy would be given the 
sovereignty over Vlora and its region, and the mandate over the remaining part of Albanian 
state of 1913. The USA intervention to oppose the British-French-Italian plan saved Albanian 
state. The determined attitude of the USA President W. Wilson, regardless of problems with 
the political opponents in Washington and his health situation, gave time to Albanians to 
organize the resistance that started in Lushnje Congress, which did not accept the Italian 
mandate and rejected any further foreign mandate. After this, resistance would continue with 
Vlora War, in order to regain the sovereignty if Albania over this region. In this way, 
regarding Albania and the Albanian Question, Peace Conference of 1919-1920 sanctioned not 
only the unjust decision of the Conference of Ambassadors if 1913, but it designed also a new 
division of Albanian state territories. The Albanian representatives reacted against those 
injustices, but again with no outcome. 
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THE ATTITUDE OF ALBANIAN DELEGATION 
 
The disregarding attitude of the Peace Conference for national rights of the Albanian 
people and neglect of the proposal that Albanian delegation submitted to this Conference 
on 7 March 1919 for the organization of a plebiscite in Albanian territories that were left 
outside the borders of Albanian state, urged this delegation to look for other political means 
in order to save the country from the risk of a new division. But delegation members did not 
reach a common opinion about the further steps that they should make. A part of it, 
composed of Memhet Konica and Dr. Mihal Turtulli, joined also by Mithat Frasheri (who was 
still in Switzerland), though that a strong critical attitude should be kept against the claims of 
Italy, in which they saw the main source of that new drama that was being prepared for 
Albania (Macmillan 2006, 159). They thought that they would change with this critical attitude 
against Italy the image crated for the delegation, to prove that it was not an annex to Rome 
representatives as it was spoken among diplomatic circles, but they had gone to Paris to 
protect the national rights of Albanians and to oppose those who violated these rights.  
There were also many delegates, member of the Albanian colony in USA, Turkey and 
Romania that were against Italian demands over Albania. Among them were Mihal Grameno, 
Parashqevi Qiriazi, Halil Pasha Alizoti (Gjirokastra), Fuat Dibra, Pandeli Evangjeli, Ibrahim 
Temo. The other part of the delegation composed of Turhan Pasha Pwrmeti, father Luigh 
Bumci, and Luigj Gurakuqi (the latter was appointed instead of Mithat Frashëri), though that 
they should follow the way of non-confrontation and non-exacerbations to achieve a 
compromise with them which would be based on respect of independence and preservation 
of territorial integrity of the country. These contradictions led to the creation of two separate 
groups of governmental delegation. Their separate actions started in April 1919, when news 
spread for the start of „Adriatic issue‟ discussion at the Conference. So, fractions sent to the 
Peace conference one Memorandum each on the same day, on 14 April. In the 
Memorandum submitted to the Conference, the fraction of Konica-Turtulli, which held the 
American-English orientation, used a very strong tone against the aim of Italy on Vlora ant it 
highlighted the negative consequences that Italian protectorate would have for Albania first 
of all from the demographic point of view. In this memorandum was stressed the dangerous 
Italian attitude to colonize Albania (Puto 2009, 103). However, the members of this group did 
not come before the Conference with their proposal to recognize the complete 
independence of Albanian state and, starting from this demand they objected the plans of 
representatives of big powers to place it under the mandate of a foreign state. Knowing the 
internal issue that existed in Albania and trying to stabilize the Albanian state and to avoid 
the Italian mandate, they required the placing of the Albanian independent state under the 
temporary mandate of the USA, or some other distant power, that „did not have‟ direct 
interest in Albania and the Balkans as well. In the 14 April‟s Memorandum, the other fraction, 
with the pro-Italian orientation, demanded for a certain time until Albanian state would 
recover not the establishment of the mandate system, but the „assistance‟ system, stressing 
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs | Vol. 6, No. 2, 2020 | eISSN 1857-9760 
Published online by the Institute for Research and European Studies at www.e-jlia.com      
     
 
                                             
 131 
the „benevolent assistance‟, of one of the big powers that the Albanian government would 
chose. This power, as the Memorandum implied, would be Italy, the „assistance‟ of which 
would be such that it should be compliant with the Albanian independence and sovereignty 
and it should not be used by Rome to colonize the country. The proposal of this fraction 
shows that it tried to avoid the mandate over Albania. But, as Memorandum of April 1919 
demonstrates, all Albanian delegates in Paris accepted the transfer of Albanian state by one 
single power. The group of Turhan Pasha, joined by Mustafa Kruja and later by two other 
government members, Mehdi Frasheri and Mufit Liboohva (who arrived in Paris at the end of 
April), made efforts to reach a bilateral agreement with Rome Government. In order to avoid 
the sovereignty over Vlora Region, they decided to recognize the „strategic and maritime‟ 
interests of Italy in this region by accepting, it Italy would guarantee the territorial integrity of 
Albanian State, the military invasion of Sazan, Karaburun and Zvwrnec, and the construction 
of a maritime military base in Pashaliman. These cessions were proposed to the Italian part 
on 28 May 1919, but their authors received no reply for it. However, after one full month, on 
28 June, the group of Turhan Pasha made changes in the delegation composition. The 
delegation head was appointed father Luigj Bumbi instead of Turhan Pasha. Avoidance of 
Turhan Pasha, who was once an Ottoman Empire ambassador, as it seems, related to the 
purpose to change somewhat the image ascribed malevolently to Albania by foreign 
propaganda as the „small Turkey‟. The delegation members would be Mehdi Frasheri, Luigh 
Gurakuqi and Lef Nosi. However, Turhan Pasha remained again as prime minister, whereas 
Mehdi Frasheri was appointed as Foreign Minister instead of Mehmet Konica. These changes 
were made by the 6 government members that were in Paris, who acted in the name of the 
other cabinet members that were in Durres. On the same day, on 28 June in the meeting of 
the 6 government members, stresses that the delegation headed by L. Bumci would continue 
to fulfill its activity, on the principle of Albanian state territorial integrity, independence and 
sovereignty” (History of Albania 2005, 289). After one month, in July, some unexpected event 
happened that alarmed Albanian political circles and the Albanian public opinion. The new 
Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tomasso Tittoni, signed an agreement with the Greek prime 
minister, E. Venizelos on 29 July 1919 for settling their contradiction (including those for 
division of Albania) and to support the claims of each other before the Peace Conference. 
This aggravation of international situation for Albania had a profound impact on Albanian 
representatives in Paris. At the end of July, Turtulli-Konica fraction joined the other part of 
Albanian delegation, from which it had detached since April. In this case, M. Konica was 
accepted to remain a delegation member, whereas, Dr. M. Turtuli would be lowered to the 
level of advisor delegate. The representatives of colonies in Paris made the same step in 
those days; they decided to cooperate with the delegation headed by L. Bumci. Meanwhile, 
the news was spread in September 1919 for acceptance of Italian mandate over Albania by 
the powers caused a new debate among Albanians in the French capital for the method of 
objecting this Conference approval. Most of the representatives of colonies required from the 
governmental delegation to come before the Peace Conference with the demand for an 
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entirely independent state as the only diplomatic means to avoid the mandate. But willing to 
guarantee necessarily to Albanian state „a benevolent and temporary assistance‟, this 
delegation came out with another proposal. In its Note addressed to the Conference on 9 
October, the governmental delegation stressed that this „assistance‟ could be given to 
Albania without establishing the mandate institution, but “through a reasonable change and 
in accordance with the spirit of the time and the needs of the country, with provisions of 
London Conference of 1913 on establishment of the Albanian state” (History of Albania 2005, 
290). According to the delegation, there were two changes that should be made in the status 
of 29 July: First, a foreign Prince should become the head of Albanian state as in 1913, with 
the difference that the Prince now should be of Italian origin (from Savoia Royal House) and 
accompanied by foreign armed forces (which did not happen in 1913), which should be Italian 
and will stay in Albania temporarily until Albanian state would be stabilized. They would be as 
escorting or accompanying forces to the prince and not as invaders of the country. The 
second change concerned Albanian‟s neutrality. This neutrality should be restored and 
„guaranteed‟ collectively by the powers as in 1913, with the difference that, if necessary, these 
powers would commission Italian government “to implement the guarantee condition” 
(AQSH 1919, 12). The 9 October‟s Note addressed to the Conference was associated by the 
delegation request to be summoned by the Conference to hear its views about the issue 
related to the future of Albania. This request had been repeated several times but it had not 
been accepted. It was only in February 1919 that Albanian delegation was summoned and 
heard for the first time by the Council of the Ten in the Conference. The Albanian delegation 
communicated with the Conference only by correspondence. In these conditions of 
discrimination by this international forum, when the Italian party was silent about Albanian 
delegation proposals and it was not showing any availability for compromise, the delegation 
made another step. The delegation presented to the Peace Conference a new Note with 
several proposals at the end of December 1919 intending to avoid the partition of the 
country. This delegation accepted to recognize some cession to the neighbors: Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the free transit of goods in northern Albania; „internal autonomy‟ 
of Orthodox communities of Korçë and Gjirokastër; for the „security‟ of Italy in the southern 
Adriatic, it stated that it was ready to submit to the Conference such a variant that preserved 
the sovereignty of Albania over Vlora and over its region. In this case, they thought that Italy 
should be allowed to build a „rented‟ military maritime base in Orik (Pashaliman) and 
recognition of Sazan island invasion. But, as previously, these proposals fell on deaf ears. 
Finding no support in the Conference, Albanian delegation sent two of its members to Rome 
at the end of 1919 to require the help of Pope. The delegation headed, the Catholic clergy, 
father Luigj Bumci met the Pope in January 1920 without reaching any conclusion resistance 
so as to prevent with it the achievement of an unfavorable equilibrium for Albania in the 
negotiations between big powers. The foundations for organization of this resistance were 
laid in Lushnje Congress (Duka 2006, 230). The Congress decided to de facto independence 
for Albania.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
It can be concluded that the USA was the major player of that time. Albania was 
recognized as an independent state. The world learned that even in very difficult and crucial 
circumstances, Albanians demonstrated their readiness and determination to protect the 
independence of their national state. They appeared as a factor that should be necessarily 
taken into consideration after this. Following the USA, by the end of 1920, Great Britain too 
would make diplomatic movements in favor of Albania. Facing London pressure, Rome 
withdrew from its attitude to prevent admission of Albania to the League of Nations on 5 
December. Albania became a member of this organization on 17 December. After this, the 
efforts of Italian diplomacy would focus on prevention of Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes, and Greek intentions towards the Albanian state in order to guarantee a privileged 
political and economic position of Italy in Albania. With the statement of 9 November 1921, 
signed together with France, Great Britain and Japan, Italy guaranteed the first, but, facing 
British opposition, it did not achieve for the second time. 
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